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█  Reply to Masrour 
 
FARID MASROUR’S PENETRATING COM-
MENTS, focussing mainly on my essays The 
Given and Intentional Objects, fall into two 
parts.  
The first part describes three theses that 
characterise my views – (1) the non-relational 
character of intentionality; (2) content plural-
ism; and (3) phenomenal intentionalism – and 
argues that there are three specific tensions 
between all or some of (1)-(3).  
The second part questions whether I can 
hold that concrete particular objects are the 
intentional objects of mental states, compati-
ble with my internalism about the mind. 
First, the tensions between (1)-(3). The first 
tension relates to (1) and (2). Masrour claims 
that a pluralism about content ought to elimi-
nate the motivation for anti-realism about con-
tent, and he takes the non-relational view of 
intentionality to be a form of anti-realism 
about content. Just as Davidson’s pluralism 
about meaning removes the disagreement be-
tween different moral systems (since they must 
be interpreted as meaning different things with 
their evaluative words) and can lead to a kind 
of realism about morality; so Chalmers’s con-
tent pluralism removes the disagreement be-
tween Russellianism and Fregeanism about 
propositions, and leaves room for a genuine 
“relationism” about intentionality:  
 
the pluralist dissolution of the disagreement 
seems to take away the motivation for re-
jecting the view that experiences can be 
identified with relations to propositions.1 
 
The point is ingenious, but I want to resist 
the idea that there is a problem here. The non-
relational character of intentionality means, to 
me, that experiences and other intentional 
states are not fundamentally relations to 
propositions. It is not, so to speak, a natural or 
interpreter-independent fact that intentional 
states are relations to propositions. It is a 
product of the fact that they are truly de-
scribed by interpreters as such relations.  
I take inspiration from the much-used anal-
ogy with physical magnitudes. We use numbers 
to measure weights, lengths and so on. Weights 
can be seen as relations to numbers. But this is 
only a product of the measuring practice; con-
sidered as part of observer-independent nature, 
weights are not relations to numbers. 
How does this relate to realism and “in-
strumentalism” about content? Content plural-
ism, as I defend it in The Given, is compatible 
with there being one way an experience or oth-
er mental state represents the world to be. In-
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deed, I think there is such a way: it is the way 
determined by the phenomenal or “real” con-
tent of the mental state. In this sense, there is a 
fact of the matter about what the “real” or phe-
nomenal content of a conscious mental state is.  
The point of the distinction between se-
mantic and phenomenal content is to identify 
those ways of representing the world that are 
intrinsic to the state itself and those that are 
artefacts of theory – relations to propositions 
are in the second category. (These remarks are 
also relevant to Alfredo Paternoster’s concerns 
about content realism). 
I would say the same kind of thing in re-
sponse to Masrour’s second worry about 
claims (1)-(3). He points out that there seems 
to be a tension between non-relationism 
(doctrine (1)) and my claim that it is literally 
true that intentional states are relations to 
propositions. This point seems plausible at 
first sight. But I want to stress that the essence 
of the idea that intentionality is not a relation, 
as I mean it, is that it is not a relation to inten-
tional objects – i.e. what is thought about, 
what is feared, what is desired etc. – but I am 
happy with the idea that some intentional 
states are relations to propositions.2 It seems 
to me that it can be literally true that an expe-
rience is a relation to a proposition even if this 
literal truth is established by the interpreta-
tions of others. The truth can be literal, 
though derivative. The same can be said about 
weights as relations to numbers. 
Third, Masrour asks how I can maintain 
non-relationism and hold that every thought 
has an object. If every thought has an object, 
then why is intentionality not a relation to 
these objects?  
Masrour offers me a number of options, 
none of which appeal to me. The last option 
he offers starts well – that I might wish  
 
to endorse a phenomenological conception 
of directedness or aboutness. Accordingly, 
intentional states have an essential phe-
nomenology of directedness or aboutness, 
and this grounds the fact that they can only 
be described in relational terms.3  
This is indeed what I think, but Masrour’s 
next remarks suggest that we cannot mean 
this in the same way: 
 
However, this seems to clash with another 
aspect of Crane’s overall outlook. On 
Crane’s version of phenomenal intentional-
ism, phenomenal consciousness is grounded 
in the entire intentional nature of mental 
states. So, Crane seems to ground phenom-
enology in intentionality. But the phenom-
enological solution seems to ground inten-
tionality in phenomenology.4 
 
This criticism presupposes that phenome-
nology and intentionality can be understood 
independently of each other. But I reject this 
presupposition. I don’t think that you can 
specify phenomenal properties (e.g. perceived 
colours and shapes) independently of how 
they seem to you, and this is a description of 
the intentionality of the experience (this point 
connects with my reply to David Pitt below). 
When I say I would endorse a phenome-
nological account of aboutness or directed-
ness, I mean that the ultimate facts about in-
tentionality involve facts about how things 
consciously appear to the subject. So I am 
taking consciousness for granted in describ-
ing the ultimate basis of intentionality. (This 
may look like having the benefits of theft 
over honest toil – but I would argue that de-
fenders of qualia are just in the same posi-
tion, by appealing to properties which are in-
trinsically conscious; this is as much of an as-
sumption of the existence of consciousness as 
is involved in my intentionalist view). 
That is my response to Masrour’s initial 
criticisms. But his main worry is that there is a 
tension between my phenomenal intentional-
ism – in the sense in which I hold that doc-
trine – and my internalism (or anti-externa-
lism). He argues that it is «undeniable that 
ordinary external particulars can be intention-
al objects of experiences», but that internal-
ism makes this obvious fact hard to sustain.5 
Masrour describes a case of subject who is 
hallucinating something that looks like the 
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Eiffel Tower, and having an experience 
where things seem exactly like they would to 
someone seeing the Eiffel Tower; and where 
there is an object (the “D-Tower”) which 
looks just like the Eiffel Tower, coincidental-
ly at the place where the Eiffel Tower seems 
to be. What is the intentional object of this 
subject’s experience? 
Masrour argues that on the one hand, it 
should not be the D-Tower, since that would 
just be a matter of luck, and one’s experience 
does not have an intentional object just 
through luck. But on the other hand, if we build 
in some causal constraints into what makes 
something an intentional object, then these 
constraints would – according to the phenom-
enal intentionalist – have to be phenomenolog-
ically manifest; and this is plainly implausible. 
I am sympathetic to this criticism of the 
proposed theory of intentional objects. And I 
agree wholeheartedly with Masrour’s convic-
tion that ordinary external particulars can be 
the intentional objects of experiences. Masrour 
misreads me on this, taking me to have a «de-
manding notion of intentional objects […] 
when [Crane] denies that concrete particulars 
can be the intentional objects of experiences».6 
I have never denied that concrete particulars – 
towers, churches, apples and oranges etc. – can 
be intentional objects. What I did deny (in the 
essay Intentional Objects) is that the category 
intentional object is the same as the category 
concrete particular.  
Here I was rejecting John Searle’s idea that 
intentional objects just are ordinary objects.7 
Since we can think about things that do not 
exist, and an intentional object is just what is 
thought about, some intentional objects do 
not exist. On this basis, I argued that being an 
intentional object is not the same as being an 
entity of any kind, even though many (most?) 
intentional objects are, in fact, entities. So like 
Masrour, I have a “permissive” conception of 
intentional objects: anything that can be 
thought (etc.) about can be an intentional ob-
ject. But it is not part of the nature of any in-
tentional object that it is an intentional object. 
What does this imply about the case of 
the hallucinated D-tower? In itself, very little. 
My view of intentional objects does allow 
that the Eiffel Tower can be the intentional 
object of an experience. I also allow that a 
subject can hallucinate the Eiffel Tower – 
though I think this is only possible if the sub-
ject had seen the Eiffel Tower or a picture of 
it. Suppose a subject who had never seen the 
Eiffel Tower had a hallucination exactly re-
sembling a knowledgable subject’s hallucina-
tion of the Eiffel Tower; would this be a hal-
lucination of the Eiffel Tower? I would say 
no; no more than an Icelandic fisherman who 
has never met her can hallucinate my mother. 
In this way, I agree with Masrour that what 
your hallucinations are of cannot be a matter 
of brute luck. 
But nor would I build some causal condi-
tion into the specification of the content of 
the experience, some condition that would de-
termine a real object as the intentional object 
of the experience. I am sceptical that there are 
any such general conditions which determine 
whether or when something is an object of a 
given thought. Elsewhere I have argued that 
we should accept many different kinds of 
thing – entities, non-entities, indeterminate 
and determinate – as objects of thought and 
we should not look for a general theory of 
what fixes something as such an object.8  
Turning finally to Masrour’s case, then, I 
would say that the space soul is not perceiving 
the D-Tower, for the reasons he says; but nor 
is it having a hallucination of the Eiffel Tower. 
It is having an experience, I am happy to 
grant, and it could probably describe the in-
tentional object of its experience in some way; 
but the intentional object of this experience is 
not a concrete particular, since it does not ex-
ist. But this fact does not stop us, we who live 
in the real world, from having concrete partic-
ulars as the objects of our thoughts.  
The key assumption that needs to be ac-
cepted here is that the content of an experience 
– how things seem – does not determine its ob-
ject. Two experiences could seem the same way 
and have different objects. This is the essence 
of internalism, as Katalin Farkas has argued.9 
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█  Reply to Paternoster 
 
Alfredo Paternoster’s interesting com-
ments revolve around the question of realism 
about intentionality. Paternoster is dissatis-
fied with my treatment of Wittgenstein’s re-
marks on intentionality, and independently 
of this, he wonders to what extent I am an 
intentional realist.  
On the question of the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, Paternoster is perhaps right 
that my attribution «you can only describe 
the object of the expectation in the way it is 
specified in the description of the expecta-
tion itself»10 may not be wholly warranted on 
the basis of Wittgenstein’s own texts. It is 
true that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the ques-
tion of intentionality are somewhat fragmen-
tary and open to other interpretations. My 
aim was to try and impose some precision on 
these remarks, and try and make sense of the 
idea that there is a merely “grammatical” 
connection between the expectation and 
what is expected. I said in my essay,  
 
we find the “contact” between expecta-
tion and fulfilment in the fact that we use 
the same words (“he’ll come in”) as an ex-
pression of what we expect, and as a de-
scription of what fulfils it.11  
 
This is why I proposed, as a generalisation 
of this point, the idea that you can only de-
scribe the object of expectation in a way that 
the description specifies. As far as I can see, 
Wittgenstein offers no further clue as to how 
to spell out his “grammatical” suggestion; but 
if Paternoster can find a better clue, then I 
look forward to hearing about it. 
The heart of my criticism of Wittgenstein 
is in the following passage from my paper: 
 
Wittgenstein’s answer in § 437 to his own 
question about what makes a proposition 
true – “Whence this determining of what 
is not yet there?” – seems to be this: the 
“determining” of what is not there simply 
consists in the grammatical truth that 
“the thought that p is the thought that is 
made true by the fact that p”. But, as we 
have observed, the thought that p can be 
made true by the fact that q: and this is 
not a grammatical remark.12 
 
Wittgenstein might wish to say that the 
fact reported by “p” and the fact reported by 
“q” have some connection between them; but 
what is that connection? By appealing to rep-
resentational content, I have an answer to 
that question: they represent the same things, 
or some of the same things, in different ways 
(different contents). What is Wittgenstein’s 
answer? I’m not saying that one can’t be giv-
en, but I can’t find it in the pages of the Phil-
osophical Investigations.13 
However, I would resist Paternoster’s de-
scription of my criticism of Wittgenstein that 
Wittgenstein’s view does not allow for any 
“perspectival” element in intentionality. Per-
spective, as I think of it, could be a “gram-
matical” fact in Wittgenstein’s eccentric use 
of that word. It could be a grammatical fact, 
for example, that “Hesperus is Hesperus” is a 
priori knowable, and “Hesperus is Phospho-
rus” is not. These facts express differences in 
perspective, in my sense. 
Paternoster’s second theme is intentional 
realism, which he characterises as «the thesis 
according to which mental states are realized 
by computational (and ultimately cerebral) 
states».14  
Although I recognise that this is one way 
that the debate about realism has been tradi-
tionally formulated, I think other ways of con-
ceiving of realism should also be on the table. 
One way of doing this to which I am attracted 
bases intentional or psychological realism on a 
commitment to the reality of psychological 
capacities and their exercises: the capacity for 
memory, perception, imagination and so on. 
Some of the exercises of these capacities are 
conscious, and some are not.  
Capacities need mechanisms, of course, 
but there is no need to assume a priori that 
these mechanisms must have a particular 
computational structure. Perhaps this is why 
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Paternoster calls me a “mild realist”. Does 
this mean that intentionality as such, as Pater-
noster says, «is just an explanatorily useful 
concept, not a genuine “real” property»?15  
This depends. The way I think of it, inten-
tionality is an abstract way of categorising the 
essential feature of certain (or all) psychologi-
cal capacities: psychological capacities and 
their exercises all have objects. But this does 
not mean that there is a quality or property – 
the natural, substantial property intentionality 
– that all these capacities and their exercises 
must have. Of course, it is true that they are 
intentional capacities, so they have the prop-
erty in the “pleonastic” sense. 
However, my talk of content pluralism in 
The Given may lead Paternoster and others to 
think that I have gone over to an “instrumen-
talist” view of intentionality, as opposed to the 
realism of Jerry Fodor and others. After all, in 
this paper I claim that there may be many con-
tents associated with a single intentional state, 
and that these models depend in a certain sense 
on the interests and purposes of the attributer.  
I am happy to acknowledge this departure 
from standard realism. It seems to me that 
many of Dennett’s points about our actual 
attributions of content have been unduly ne-
glected, and I think the philosophy of mind 
would do well to go back and consider them. 
It’s time to step back from the commitment 
to heavy duty theses like the Language of 
Thought hypothesis. 
 
█ Reply to Perconti 
 
Pietro Perconti helpfully outlines the im-
portance of the issue of psychologism in gen-
eral, noting that the  
 
coming and going of psychologism and 
anti-psychologism is in fact a typical fea-
ture in the history of the theory of 
knowledge in the modern age.16  
 
He gives a lucid description of what I take 
psychologism about the psychological to be. 
But he criticises me for my claim that psy-
chologism is not simply the investigation of 
commonsense or folk psychological concepts 
or categories. On the contrary, he argues, if 
the study of the mind is going to be open to 
empirical investigation, then it must also be 
sensitive to the things that empirical science 
finds out about folk psychological categories. 
The more we discover about the mechanisms 
of the mind, the more it will raise questions 
about the reality of things picked out by our 
psychological concepts like belief, desire, in-
tention and so on. So a genuinely psycholo-
gistic approach should not ignore folk psycho-
logical concepts. 
Perconti is quite right here, and I should 
not have said or implied that psychologism 
should have no interest in the folk psychologi-
cal. In fact, psychologism is a good way to ad-
dress the interaction between the com-
monsense conception of the mind and the 
findings of science. Our understanding of one 
another starts by assuming the integrity of cer-
tain psychological categories – memory, imag-
ination, perception etc. – the things I call the 
intentional modes. These categories divide up 
mental reality into capacities or faculties, ac-
cording to our commonsense scheme. How 
does what we learn from neuroscience and 
psychology affect this classification?  
It is implausible that there is some general 
recipe here for deciding when a psychological 
category is part of the scientifically validated 
architecture of the mind. But it is pretty clear 
from the current state of cognitive neurosci-
ence that certain fundamental categories are 
here to stay – vision, language, intention and 
decision-making – while other coarse-grained 
folk psychological categories (e.g. emotion 
and reasoning) need to be broken down in the 
light of empirical evidence. These discoveries 
can then feed back into the commonsense 
conception of the mental, as Perconti says. 
How does this relate to the distinction be-
tween empirical science and conceptual anal-
ysis, which Perconti claims I am returning to?  
There are various distinctions one can 
make here, but what is important to me is to 
distinguish between our everyday, or folk or 
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commonsense knowledge of the mental, and 
conceptual analysis, as that idea has been un-
derstood in the fairly recent philosophical 
tradition. This tradition has thought of con-
ceptual analysis in terms of non-circular nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the appli-
cation of a concept. I don’t see any future in 
this notion, and I don’t think its viability is 
presupposed by the idea of commonsense 
knowledge of the mental. 
 
█ Reply to Pitt 
 
David Pitt is a philosopher whose views are, 
to my way of thinking, deeply psychologistic. 
Indeed, if he hadn’t called his 2009 paper Inten-
tional Psychologism,17 this would have served as 
a good title for my own book.  
His own version of psychologism takes 
things in a rather different direction from 
mine, and his conception of the relationship 
between the phenomenal and the intentional 
is not quite the same as mine (essentially, he 
believes that there is an independently under-
standable conception of the phenomenal in 
terms of which conscious intentionality can be 
understood, and I deny this).  
But there is so much we share in our ap-
proach to these matters that I am delighted 
to have his perceptive and thoughtful critical 
comments here. 
Pitt takes issue with my view that beliefs 
are not conscious. I argued this on the 
grounds that beliefs are (i) states, not events; 
and (ii) that, as states, they persist through 
changes in, and the absence of, conscious-
ness: you still count as believing things when 
you are asleep. Pitt questions both these ide-
as. He argues, against (i), that there can be an 
event of believing something – why isn’t 
coming to believe a case of belief?  
And against (ii), he thinks that although 
we say people believe things when they are 
asleep, this is like saying that they have a 
good singing voice when they are asleep – it 
is just a disposition to have conscious beliefs. 
Indeed, he thinks that «belief is essentially 
an occurrent, experiential phenomenon […] 
beliefs cannot be unconscious».18 I will take 
these two points in turn. 
On the question of coming to believe, 
there is one issue on which we agree: that 
there really is such a thing as coming to be-
lieve, and this is an event. I deny this event is 
itself a belief, any more than coming to own a 
house is owning a house, or getting married is 
being married. Pitt asks how can it be «that 
belief is essentially a taking-to-be or accepting 
or endorsement, if these are events»?19  
My reply is that that “taking-to-be” is a 
term that can apply to long-held convictions 
(“For years I have taken Italy to be the coun-
try that has perfected the art of making cof-
fee”) or to experiential occurrences (“From 
what I have tasted so far, I take this wine to 
be a New Zealand Pinot Noir”). And the 
same applies to accepting or endorsing. It is 
clear that, in the way we ordinarily talk, there 
are two kinds of thing: the persisting state 
and the experiential occurrence. Which one 
deserves the name “belief”?  
The standard view is: both. My view is: 
the first. Pitt’s view is: the second. The ap-
peal to notions like taking-to-be, acceptance 
or endorsement does not settle the question in 
favour of any of these answers. 
So what would settle it? Sometimes the 
question can seem merely terminological. Pitt 
and I both agree that there is the conscious oc-
currence and the persisting unconscious state. 
Does it matter whether or not we call one “be-
lief” or not? Well, there is the fact that we ordi-
narily say that people believe things whether or 
not they are currently contemplating them, or 
conscious at all. Pitt argues that this is a super-
ficial fact – we might say that someone is a 
good singer when all this means is that they 
have the disposition to sing well, and can have 
this disposition even when asleep.  
I am perfectly happy to say that the belief 
is a disposition to have certain experiences 
and thoughts, so long as we also allow that this 
very same disposition controls the subject’s 
actions (something which is left out of Pitt’s 
picture, at least as described in the current pa-
per). When one adds that the same (disposi-
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tional) state controls both what we say and 
consciously think, and what we (consciously 
or unconsciously) do, then I think this adds up 
to saying the dispositional state is a belief.  
But if Pitt disagrees with me, I will not 
mind so long as he accepts that the uncon-
scious persisting state has the properties I 
have just mentioned; we can then just agree to 
differ on how to use the word “belief”. How-
ever, the claim that there is a single state that 
has all these properties is not a trivial claim – 
so if he disagrees with this, there is something 
substantial we are really disagreeing about. 
However, Pitt thinks that there is an in-
dependent reason to reject my view and my 
taxonomy, which comes from the fact that 
unconscious dispositions cannot have any 
phenomenal content. If this is so, then they 
cannot have the same content as a conscious 
thought. And if this is so, then the content of 
conscious thoughts cannot be phenomenally 
constituted, and so I cannot hold the phe-
nomenal intentionality thesis, as he and oth-
ers understand it.20  
Pitt is absolutely right that it is not possi-
ble to hold the phenomenal intentionality 
thesis, the thesis that unconscious beliefs and 
conscious thoughts can have the same con-
tent, and the thesis that all beliefs are uncon-
scious. He urges me to give up the thesis that 
all beliefs are unconscious. But for me the 
choice is obvious: the phenomenal intention-
ality thesis is not something I have ever en-
dorsed and it doesn’t fit with my conception 
of the relationship between intentionality 
and phenomenology. I will finish my com-
ments with a brief explanation. 
In order to defend the idea that “content 
is phenomenally constituted” as a substantive 
doctrine, one has to have relatively inde-
pendent ideas of content and phenomenolo-
gy (or “phenomenality”). One way to have 
these independent ideas is to take content to 
be the proposition, and phenomenality to be 
a matter of having qualia. These are inde-
pendent ideas and on the usual understand-
ing, they are ideas of very different things – 
propositions are abstract entities, qualia are 
concrete properties of mental states. So un-
derstood, it is barely intelligible how proposi-
tions might be constituted out of qualia.  
But Pitt’s view of propositions is more 
psychologistic – he says that propositional 
contents are instantiated in the mind, and 
these instantiations are thoughts.21 If phe-
nomenal qualities are also instanced in the 
mind, then one can begin to see how one 
might construct thought-episodes out of such 
qualities – though we are owed an account of 
these qualities, or at least a description. Pitt’s 
forthcoming book will no doubt provide this. 
What I am sceptical about in this picture is 
not so much the idea that contents are instan-
tiated as thoughts – though I would not put it 
this way myself – but the idea that there are 
phenomenal properties which can be identi-
fied independently of what they represent 
(their intentional objects) and the way it is 
represented (their contents). Colours, for ex-
ample, strike us as out there in the world, as 
properties of the surfaces of material objects.  
Maybe this is not the actual truth about 
colour, but it is the phenomenological truth – 
this is how things seem. And I claim that this 
phenomenal truth seems to be a representa-
tional truth. Our conscious states of mind rep-
resent the colours out there. And what applies 
to colour applies to the other properties of 
which we are aware. This, in brief, is the rea-
son why I think the phenomenal and the in-
tentional are so intertwined that the prospects 
of identifying sufficiently independent phe-
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